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Abstract
This paper presents a theoretical framework along “Classical” lines in which Schumpeter’s concept of
“Creative Response” is linked to a theory of induced innovation and the concept of technological regimes.
We devote particular attention to the role of indivisibilities between factors of production. On the basis of
this framework, we study the adoption of early information technologies, such as typewriters, calculators or
Hollerith machines in US manufacturing in the period between 1870 and 1930. We show how the presence of
a distinct bias in technical change in US manufacturing led to the opening of a window of opportunity for
early information technologies, and how the presence of this bias influenced the technological search and
adoption process of firms and how this found its final reflection in the rules and heuristics of the new regime.
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1.  Introduction
According to Smith, Ricardo, Marx and later Schumpeter the capitalist economic development is in
essence a continual reconfiguration of production and distribution processes. It can take the form of
incremental changes or become manifest through radical departures from established practices,
which may cause shifts in the technological system or give rise to new techno-economic paradigms
(Freeman and Perez (1988): p. 45-47).
If a change in a techno-economic paradigm takes place then a large number of economic
subsystems will change as well and a number of new technological regimes (Dosi (1982)) will be
established. Most of the heterodox approaches to technical change find it difficult to capture such
phenomena adequately, partly because they take an aggregate view, and partly because they lack an
explanation for microeconomic incentive structures.
In the Marxian tradition for instance radical change in the capitalist system would be considered to
come along with a raise in labour productivity and a fall in the productivity of capital, with the
labour displacing Babbage principle dominating any technical advance (see e.g. Hecht (2001)).
Even though Marx’ work and studies in his tradition (e.g.  Braverman (1974)) have provided
evidence for this, it may not be the rule, as historical time series suggest (see Duménil and Levy
(1995)).
Kaldorian analysts instead would be likely to link the phenomenon to changes in the patterns of
capital accumulation and enlist the embodiment hypothesis. Even though this approach is important
as it rejects the neo-classical notion of malleable capital, it lacks an elaborate model of how the
“clay” character of capital influences investment decisions, especially under conditions of
economic strain.
Evolutionary theories have taken a more differentiated view: on a high level of aggregation the
transition from one techno-economic paradigm to another is viewed as a substitution process in
which a more efficient technology system gradually drives out the established one (examples are
Duménil and Lévy (1996) and Silverberg and Lehnert (1993)). On a sectoral level evolutionary
work has provided much insight on the dynamics of entry and exit, but has largely failed to provide
a satisfactory concept of technological search and adoption (see Malerba and Orsenigo (1995),
Metcalfe (1998)). Firms are assumed to merely stumble over a new technology in a stochastic
search process, taking place in the neighbourhood of their actual technology.
1 These models are
able to capture the path-dependent character of techno-economic development, but they don’t tell
us why - given a specific institutional and economic environment - one location in the spectrum of
techniques is preferred to another, how any change is timed, and once a location is chosen how this
choice influences the activities and related heuristics of the technological regimes that are
established around that location.
The aim of this paper is to do a humble step in that direction. We believe that for the analysis of
changes in the technological system or techno-economic paradigm shifts the influence of prices on
unit costs (instead of the other way round) as well as the role of indivisibilities in technologies
should not be neglected. By borrowing some of the concepts of the theoretical approaches
mentioned before, we attempt to sharpen Schumpeter’s concept of creative response (Schumpeter
(1947)) and study the technology adoption decisions of firms in a changing environment. For this
purpose we have chosen the historical case of the adoption and enforcement of early information
technologies in US manufacturing.
2 We build on and complement contributions of Freeman (1989)
                                                
1 The diamond metric in Nelson and Winter (1982) or the innovation region in Duménil and Lévy (1996) are examples
for this.
2 By early information technologies we mean all mechanical and electromechanical devices developed for and used to
store, handle and process data. The specific technologies studied here comprise typewriters, calculators, file systems,
pneumatic tubes etc. We have termed this regime the "First IT Regime" in order to distinguish it from the diffusion of4
and David (1991), as well as David and Wright (1999), who in their discussions of the diffusion of
electric power generation technology in the late nineteenth century have repeatedly underscored the
importance of parallel innovations in the management and administration of firms.
2.  Creative response: the choice of technique, its technical bias, and
technological regimes
2.1.  Choice of technique and technical bias
The adoption of a new technology is the result of an investment decision of a firm. Under
competitive conditions a firm will choose a technique that minimises its current and near term cost
and allows obtaining a supra-normal profit.
3 The cost structure of any given technique is very likely
to depend on specific environmental and institutional factors. They determine its viability and
constrain the firm’s technology choice directly or indirectly. If the constraints are constant over
some period of time, then a systematic bias is likely to emerge in response to the persistency of
given factor price relations in the economy. In general the technology should be biased towards the
relatively less scarce factors entering production. This is also plausible if it is assumed that through
a unit of research investment factor savings of equal proportion can be achieved. Then the return on
the research investment in the more expensive factor will be higher ( Binswanger and Ruttan
(1978): p.25) and constantly higher relative prices of the scarcer inputs will point to the higher cost-
saving potential. If the socio-economic environment changes firms will try to adjust their
technology accordingly.
It is useful to distinguish between the influence given environmental and institutional conditions
exert on the proportions in which factors enter production and their influence on the scale of output.
We will first study the effect on proportions. Let us assume - in a Classical fashion - that capital
goods are infinitely accumulable as they are produced means of production. Natural resources
instead may be available in the quantities needed in the short run, but as they are non-accumulable
means to become scarce in the long run.
4 Labour, finally, may be scarce in the short run and
become abundant in the long run depending on the type of activities performed and the scale of
production.  To classical economists changes in labour supply are endogenously determined, as the
process of accumulation will lead to an increase in real wages followed by an entry of new labour
power.
5 But this assumption is plausible for unskilled labour only. Skilled labour instead needs
training and education time. It is not immediately available in the quantities needed. For this reason
the entry rate of skilled labour in response to a changing level of the reservation wage is likely to be
in-elastic in the short run.  Under the given assumptions the observed proportions for some
resources and skilled labour should be below average, i.e. a technical bias that saves on resources
and skilled labour should be observed.
                                                                                                                                                   
semiconductor devices and related data-processing machinery starting from the middle of the twentieth century,
associated with classical studies such as Perez (1985), Dosi (1984), Malerba (1985) or Freeman and Soete (1994).
3 Although we do not postulate that firms indeed follow such behaviour, it will become clear that the assumptions put
forward in this section suffice to describe the development of the First IT Regime. In the exposition we draw on David
(1975): chapt. 1, Radner (1975), Binswanger and Ruttan (1978): chapt. 2, Nelson and Winter (1982), Kurz and Salvadori
(1997) and Foley and Michl (1999).
4 We have to distinguish between non-reproducible resources and exhaustible resources. The former do not exhaust, but
are of limited size and show diminishing returns as intensity of use increases, while the latter merely "evaporate" due to
the entropy law and become increasingly scarce. Economic history shows that even though exhaustible resources are
limited and single deposits exhaust, in most cases new deposits are found. It follows that only in a situation where
demand is such that there are capacity constraints decreasing returns arise, as also the least profitable deposits have to be
exploited (see Kurz and Salvadori (1997); p.359 ff).
5 Different traditions of thought give different explanations:  Technical progress may be thought as setting free enough
workers or the real wage may lie over the reservation level of some part of the potential workforce.5
It is important to consider at which points in time the quantity constraints on the factors become
binding. Skilled labour may plausibly be considered being available in abundance in the long run,
as in analogy to unskilled labour it will be produced endogenously to the economic process, but as
not being immediately available in the short run. Natural resources instead may in general be
available immediately but become scarce as the depletion of their funds reaches its limits. In the
short run skilled labour scarcity and resource abundance should produce a bias bending towards a
more intense use of capital and resources, while in the long run skilled labour abundance and
increasing resource scarcity may eventually reverse this trend. However, we have also to take into
account the influence of the scale of production in order to get to a more general statement on the
causes of technology adoption.
It is a common conjecture that each technology has an optimum scale of operation. The larger the
scale of production, the more stringent will factor scarcities be felt. As the proportions at which
factors enter the production process are quasi-fixed for each technique in the short run, a shift in the
scale will increase unit costs for any technique operating at or close to its optimum scale. This will
induce cost minimising firms to switch to techniques using scarce factors at a lower intensity. From
our conclusion before we may deduce that a substitution of skilled labour for capital and resources
in all successively adopted technologies will take place, safe that the composition of output and the
rate at which shifts occur as well as their sign remain stable over time. This is the situation we find
in the historical accounts on the development of the US economy in the nineteenth century (see
section 3). If we consider instead the case where the sign of the shifts in output changes frequently
and/or the composition of output changes due to an unstable composition of demand, cost-
minimising firms will attempt to keep the utilisation rate of capital at the highest possible level, as
capital represents fixed costs of production whilst labour is a variable cost component. For this
reason they may not have an incentive to build up capacities through an increase of the capital
stock, but to use skilled labour more intensely, which in situations of positive output shifts will
drive up wages, but allow adjusting quickly to changes in the size and composition of output. This
was the situation in the United Kingdom in the nineteenth century (see Habakkuk (1962), and
especially Fries (1975)).
From this discussion it becomes clear that the environmental conditions determining the size and
the composition of output, will act as a signpost in the search for alternative techniques in the way
postulated by Nelson and Winter (1982). They will give rise to technological regimes. It should
hence be possible to deduce some general characteristics of the heuristics emerging in these
regimes from the general technological bias in the economy in which firms act.
2.2.  Technical bias and technological regimes
A starting point for such an analysis is the approach suggested by Saviotti and Metcalfe (1984) who
characterise a technological regime through what they have called process technology – i.e. the
characteristics of the processes used for the production of technologies with certain technical
characteristics - as well as through the product technology – i.e. the services these technologies
provide to the user given certain technical characteristics of the final product.
6 Our analysis here is
concerned with the general properties of the product technology vector and its co-evolution with
the process technology of any potential technology. Here a few more considerations on the
characteristics of a technology are in place.
                                                
6 More formally Saviotti and Metcalfe (1984) assume a vector of technical characteristics: ﬁ xt , which gives the
process technology, with x being the input vector and t representing the technological characteristics. The vector of
process characteristics in turn spans a Lancasterian service characteristics space:  ﬁ ts . This projection is called
product technology. Assuming a simple linear transformation the latter relationship may be described by a linear system
of inequalities  ‡ Ats , with A being the transformation matrix.  ‡ reflects the constraint that a minimum number of
technical characteristics must be present in order to give rise to a viable product technology. The discrepancy between
product and user technology determines the development pattern of the industry producing the technology as adopters act
as selection mechanism of technological designs, see Windrum and Birchenhall (1998).6
In the crude state of technological development the production of any commodity may be assumed
to be non-separable in its inputs and to enter the production process in virtually fixed proportions.
In an expanding economy this would lead inevitably to diminishing returns, as the non-
accumulable inputs represent a limit to growth, which has to be compensated. As a consequence
cost-minimising firms will search for techniques of production, which use accumulable factors at
higher intensities, i.e. they will try to make the production process as independent as possible from
non-accumulable or otherwise scarce inputs. Analysing the problem by factor classes one
recognises that the production process will always be indivisible from resource use. Fixed capital
by itself is produced of matter and due to the entropy law all resources will eventually become
scarce. A higher intensity of use of fixed capital may also come along with a more intense use of
variable capital, especially when the state of art in technological development is such that the tools
applied operate in a rather resource using way. The only way out of this conjectured dilemma is to
gradually substitute scarce for less scarce resources, to use more resource saving technologies
which can be achieved either through the overall reduction or an increase in the intensity of use of
joint products or through the closure of material cycles.
7
A high degree of separation of the production process from specific types of labour is nevertheless
possible. It is achievable through the codification of activities and their transformation into
blueprints. The division of labour is a mean to reduce the tacitness of knowledge in the production
process and shorten the time needed to produce specific skilled labour types.
8 Knowledge on the
workflow of a given production process is codified into specific designs and sequences of
activities, which now can be executed jointly. This reduces education time of skilled workers,
speeds up production and gives rise to disembodied technical progress. Once the division of labour
has progressed so far that the original skills are reduced to single chunks of interrelated
information, a complete codification and a subsequent embodiment into specific mechanic
movements of machines becomes possible. Roundaboutness of production is so substituted for
education time. The degree to which this will happen will depend on the one hand on how
economical the embodiment of skills is. The costs of codification may plausibly be considered an
increasing function of the complexity of the involved knowledge. On the other hand the viability of
an embodiment strategy depends on the recurrence of specific tasks as well.  If the latter change
continuously, embodiment is not a feasible option. The fundamental characteristic of technologies
and the specific technological bias of a socio technical environment influence the character of
operational heuristics of the regime, which represent the linkage between the single elements in the
input vector of new activities. They shape the service characteristics adopters require from a new
technology.
Even though we limit our analysis to the case where skilled labour is comparatively more
expensive than capital and a shift in the scale of adopters processes takes place, the analysis could
easily be generalised to any constellation of demand composition, scale and technical bias. From
what has been said before we should expect the new processes to run at a higher capital intensity,
than previous activities. This means that the capital-labour ratio should increase over time towards
a technologically optimal configuration. Of course this trend could also be reversed, if capital
saving innovations in other activities take place.
9 The technical characteristics of the new
technologies should be such as to allow a maximum degree of separability between the factors, or
                                                
7 The qualifications of footnote 4 nevertheless apply.
8 By tacit knowledge we mean specific process experience and expertise acquired by an operator of a technology through
the work with it, by refining and developing some basic operations. This reflects the properties of knowledge, which
represents the capacity of an individual to link pieces of information and basic actions in a way that he or she can
creatively operate with it. This tacitly acquired knowledge is not codified as it is context dependent and reflects the
intellectual history of the operator. The transfer to other individuals thus cannot be immediately.
9 This is not a contradiction to what has been said, we have just to consider innovations that substitute some capital
intense sub-processes in each firm with the production of the substitute taking place in a centralised form. Nevertheless,
in the analysis developed so far we would have talked about such a case as a paradigm shift, as the fundamental
relationship between input factors has changes.7
in other words show a maximum of embodiment. Where this is not possible at all or only to a very
limited extent, human-machine interfaces are likely to play a crucial role, as they represent the part
of the technology that links labour and capital and therefore the locus where human skills are
translated into mechanical operations. In the search for a separable design standards are of
uttermost importance, they are a necessary condition for an increase in the division of labour and
disembodied technical progress.
10 The specialisation of skills and standardised activities are thus a
premise for an increase of productivity. The design of standardised human-machine interfaces that
allow for specialisation is essential. In cases where an embodiment was not possible, we should
expect the emergence of new professions of skilled workers being specialised in the operation of
one particular interface of a machine. By that the time education time and hence the pressure on the
factor prices and the labour market should decrease. In the case where full embodiment is possible,
the interface is not important and embodied skills become obsolete. This will reduce the skill
requirements and thus shift labour inputs from the skilled to the unskilled pool.
3.  Changes in the constraints in American technology in the 19
th
century: the opening of a window of opportunity
3.1. The Bias in American technology and the American System of Manufactures
There is substantial agreement that the cause for the American capital deepening bias are related to
three factors: First, the shortage of skilled labour provided a strong incentive to embody knowledge
into capital and use unskilled labour instead, which was available due to the abundant inflow of
immigrants ( Habakkuk (1962),  Rosenberg (1976),  Montgomery (1987)). Second, the relative
abundance of natural resources in wood, water, carbon and ores allowed a resource and capital
intense mode of production (Abramovitz (1989), Wright (1990), Rosenberg (1976)). And third, the
structure and growth of demand favoured the production of homogeneous goods on large scale, as
demand was growing at the pace of the increasing population, which more than tripled in the five
decades between 1850 and 1900 (Burn (1931): 306;  Abramovitz and David (1995): 17).
11 The
relatively low spread in income distribution and the high pace of expansion of demand made the
United States a seller's market, where the satisfaction of given needs was more important than the
variety of given products. The combined effect of these factors explains why foreign observers
noticed that American producers tended to "overlook defects [of machines] more than in Europe"
and were "satisfied if a machine intended to supersede domestic labour [would] work even
imperfectly" (Burn (1931): ibid). The technological development in the US was located at and
biased towards the capital intense end of the spectrum of feasible techniques (Ames and Rosenberg
(1968), Abramovitz and David (1973), Rosenberg (1976)).
The stability of the factor price relationship determined embodied technical progress ( David
(1975): p.88) and the specific composition and scale of demand favoured the production of
standardised final goods. In reaction to these circumstances a new mode of production emerged in
the mechanical industries and spread from there to different sectors of the economy. Firms had
started to direct their attention towards the development of a specific production method, which
used standardised parts produced by means of specialised machine tools. This lowered the
dependence on critically skilled labour, but came at the expense of a more intense use of natural
resources (Ames and Rosenberg (1968): p. 831). The American System of Manufactures, as it has
been called, emerged in the 1840s (Hounshell (1984), Hoke (1989)). This mode of production was
economically viable only when production and assembly were carried out within one plant, as the
high capital costs could be offset only trough lower costs in the assembly and product design
                                                
10 In more recent literature on industrial organisation authors are mostly concerned with how inseparabilities and
standards between technologies are a result of strategic behaviour.
11 The population grew from about 23 million in 1850 to 76 million in 1900, reaching 105 million in 1920.8
processes. This contributed to increase the minimum efficient scale of operation and firm size
(Fries (1975): p.384).
It becomes evident that the American System of Manufactures in the United States is an archetype
of a national style of production and technology if it is compared to the British development. In
Britain more marked differences in the distribution of income and relative scarcity of natural
resources favoured a labour intense but resource saving increase in the division of labour which
gave rise to a system of vertically disintegrated but highly flexible shops which could match
quickly changing demand patterns (Landes (1969): chap.2, Fries (1975): p.384). It becomes evident
here that macroeconomic conditions had an influence on micro-level technology choices.
3.2.  The opening of a window of opportunity and the formation of a niche of
application for information technologies
3.2.1.  Inconsistencies in the American production system and the emergence of large
business organisations
The information structure of the manufacturing enterprises in the US in the period of dominance of
the American System of Manufactures was rather simple. Firms were single activity units
specialising in distinct niches in production. As long as they remained relatively small information
was available in an informal way at virtually no cost.
Larger manufacturing firms relied on a decentralised and distributed form of shop-floor control
called inside contracting (Littler (1982)) where the plant manager contracted internal craftsmen to
organise the production of a given number of items in a given period of time for a negotiated price
using the manufacturer's factory, tools and materials. The contractor managed his own workforce
and organised work.  Inside contracting system was an efficient method of indirect control, as it
avoided administrative overheads by acting partly "as a substitute for accounting" and distributed
the risk of operations (Hopper and Armstrong (1991): 415). The accounting records reflected
external market transactions and contained virtually no information about internal operations.
In the period between 1870 and 1900 the competitive pressure intensified due to the development
of continuous process technologies and the extension of transportation and communication
networks. The increasing urbanisation of the US led to a change the patterns of demand making it
more volatile leading to an inconsistency of the production system. Depressions occurred in the
1870s and the early 1890s (Fullerton (1988): p.111). The growth rate of the US economy slowed
down from an average value of 6.55 % in the period 1879 to 1888 to 3.35 % in the period of 1889-
1889.
12 This development caused also a persistent fall of the profit rate and an economy wide fall of
the capital utilisation rate in the years between 1889 and 1898 (Duménil and Levy (1995): p. 354-
56). The American System of Manufactures approached a technological and organisational
bottleneck.
Business managers realised that the tendency towards mass production of the American System
with its capital-intensive and overhead-sensitive mode of production, required a large, steady and
predictable demand to assure an adequate return on investment, which could be guaranteed only by
a high and constant capacity utilisation. Firms started pursuing market segmentation strategies
through new product designs, advertising and geographical diversification. In order to co-ordinate
production and distribution, mass producers integrated vertically into distribution. The strategy of
firms was to set up networks of agreements, pools and trusts in order to reduce the pressure on
profits. As antitrust legislation discouraged these forms of organisation the large enterprise
emerged on the scene. The “corporate revolution” gained momentum after the depression in the
                                                
12 See  Kendrick (1961): table A-XXII: p. 333-35. Also Total factor productivity calculations show a marked slowdown
of total factor productivity in manufacturing in the period between 1889 and 1929 (Kendrick (1961): table D-I: p. 464 and
David (1991): table 2 and figure 4, p.323).9
1890s, when a massive merger wave merged interdependent enterprises into more and more
vertical integrated units with common ownership. The rise in size required new methods of
management for the co-ordination on the shop floor and new forms of finance as larger funds had
to be collected. Therefore the emergence of the managerial enterprises integrated the two main
aspects of keeping the profit rate at a high level. Their emergence went hand in hand with advances
in organisation and technology within firms and the rise of finance and the stock market,
representing the allocation of capital among industries and firms.
The multifunctional managerial enterprise (or the U-form) emerged, but this required the set up of
an administration. The transformation of the enterprise form a purely productive entity towards the
modern large enterprise, with its differentiated activities, its hierarchy and a network of complex
communication channels and information filters acting "as a substitute for market mechanisms"
(Chandler and Daems (1979): p.4) took place gradually.
3.2.2.  The opening of a niche of application for information technologies: new business
organisations and clerical labour shortage in the late 1870s
As competition was stepped up cost control became important, but with the inside contracting
system it was impossible to obtain precise and comparable cost data. The first response to this
problem was the Systematic Management movement, which "based its reassertion of control and
co-ordination on record keeping and flows of written information up, down, and across the
hierarchy" with the aim to "transcend reliance on the individual in favour of dependence on
system" and to monitor and evaluate performance ( Yates (1989): 10-11). In the late 1870s
manufacturers began to introduce labour cost records and to pay wages directly to employees. This
allowed to monitor the performance of single workshops, reduce the variance of cost, to
redistribute profits from the contractors to the manufacturers and led to the gradual demise of the
inside contracting system, as salaried foremen replaced contractors.
The first flow control management systems were pioneered in the late 1870s. Thereby accounting
was transformed from a method of record keeping of past performance to a current cost
management tool. Reporting methods, cost accounting, production scheduling, incentive plans and
other measures, were set up in order to create an unhindered flow of materials and information, to
transfer authority from foremen to plant managers and force employees to pay grater attention to
the management's goals (Litterer (1963)). Communication became formalised: the centralised staff
department communicated downwards imparting the orders of the management, while foremen had
to compile reports for the work office. The practical implementation of these systems led to the
transfer of many of the foreman's functions and powers to centralised staff departments.
With the refinement and expansion of Systematic Management in the 1900s through the "scientific"
principles enounced by Frederick Taylor, the bureaucratic control of the shop floor became even
tighter. The division of labour was brought to its extremes. Standard costing became the chief
monitoring instrument: "true" standard costs were based "on the engineering redesign and analysis
of the labour process" as they are determined by the engineering staff (Johnson and Kaplan (1987),
Hopper and Armstrong (1991): p.420). The combination of setting of "scientific and optimal" cost
standards and the evaluation of performance with the help of variance reporting made standard
costing such an effective instrument of management.
Business hierarchies grew from the top down through vertical integration and the take over of new
functions, and from bottom-up as new hierarchical layers were introduced in order to gain control
over the shop floor. The problem that arose under this circumstance was to reduce the delay of
information flows. To handle this problem new information processing technologies and clerical
staff to operate them were needed.10
In the 1880s and the early 1890s the problem of labour supply of skilled clerical work was
pressing. Clerical work had still the characteristics of a craft and there existed no vocational
training institutions for that type of profession ( Wooton and Kemmerer (1996): p. 549). The
ensuing shortage was overcome by recruiting high school graduated women. Clerical work required
English-language skills and a social background that excluded first generation immigrants and
working class people. For these women opportunity to work as clerks were very attractive, as many
other trades were inaccessible to them. The share of female clerks rose from 2,4% in 1870 to 35,9%
in 1910.
13 They provided the material to fill up the typing, computing and book-keeping pools
leading to a segregation of the labour market for clerical work along gender lines, where
management activities were carried out by men and labour intense and routine operations were
done by women (Hartman Strom (1992): p.287; (Davies (1988): p.30). After 1890 the number of
private commercial schools increased very rapidly and their graduates contributed together with the
increasing mechanisation of the office to relax the pressure on the labour market (Pirker (1962):
p.69). The utilisation of the female 'reserve army' brought considerable cost savings as the earnings
of female clerks were consistently 25 to 45 percent lower of their male colleagues (Hartman Strom
(1992): p.290, Davies (1988): p.32). The average annual earnings of clerks in US manufacturing
fell during the two decades between 1899 and 1919.
14
4.  The establishment of the First IT Regime in US manufacturing and
the standardisation of office practices
“It was not an accident of fate” (Cortada (1993): p.63) that an office equipment industry was built
up at about the time when large, multifunctional enterprises emerged by the early 1880s. Between
1870 and 1890 most information processing devices were invented and innovated (1873:
typewriters, 1879: cash registers, 1885: calculators, 1889: Hollerith system, etc.), paralleled by
complementary organisational innovations, new forms of distribution networks and marketing tools
as well as innovations in the organisation of production. The new technological regime consisted of
a number of (electro-) mechanical devices, such as typewriters, calculators, dictating machines,
mimeographs, cash registers, timekeeping machines, automatic mailing machines, sorting devices,
filing systems, etc. and supported the establishment of new standards of practice in office.
15 We
will limit the scope of our analysis to typewriters, calculators, book keeping machines and Hollerith
machines.
4.1. The search for new standards of practice and the rise of the office work
paradigm
In the new large business administrations information was produced and processed for the first time
on industrial scale. The shortage of clerical workers and low potentials for productivity advances
made the constraints set by the terse labour market for clerical workers stringent in the 1880s.
These circumstances resembled on smaller scale the situation that had led to the development of the
American System of Manufactures four decades before. The standardisation of skills could hence
be used as an method to relax the wage-pressure on the labour market.
                                                
13 1880: 4,3%, 1890: 16,9%, 1900: 26,5%, 1910: 35,9%, 1920: 48,4% and 1930: 52%, Sources 1870-1940: total Clerical
Workers compiled form J.M. Hooks Woman's Occupations through seven decades US Department of labour 1947 and
Historical Statistics, Abstracts of the US Series D57-71 Later: US Bureau of Census Statistical Abstract (1972).
14 The average annual earnings of clerks in US manufacturing dropped from 1920US$ in 1899 (1929 prices) to 1385US$
in 1919. In the same period the average annual earning of a worker increased from 767,6 US$ to 784,9 US$, (Census
(1976), P 1-12).
15 Brauner and Vogt (1921) provide an almost complete listing of all the office appliances available round 1921.11
One of the most interesting characteristics of the American System is that it represented a meta-
heuristic or problem solving algorithm for any problem in the production sphere. It gained
importance also in the efforts to restructure office work as engineers played an important role in the
design of new administrative organisations and related office practices. They tried to cast the logic
of the shop-floor into the organisational machinery: in accordance with their experience from the
shop floor office machines had to be instrumental in realising a system of standardised activities
aiming at the saving of skilled labour and time. The primary objective was to reduce the
dependence of administrative processes on skilled clerical labour by increasing the separability of
labour and capital good inputs. This process was analogous to the reorganisation efforts on the shop
floor, where engineers had pursued the model of a system of modular production based on
standardised parts and activities. Accordingly the key requirements of the new office machinery
were summarised very concisely by  Leffingwell and Robinson (1950): 282-3): "When should
office machines be used? To save labour, to save time, to promote accuracy and to relieve
monotony."
16
The build-up of an administrative organisation consisted of two distinct but closely related steps.
First, by standardising tasks, data and information channels the division of labour in administrative
work was increased.  This step was follow by the mechanisation of the activities.
The standardisation of data and tasks proved to be an important precondition for the introduction of
office machines, as they could unfold their full productivity potential only if a smooth flow of
standardised and indexed information was available. But this was possible only where information
was quantitative, standardised or purely numeric. Knowledge intense activities or tasks involving
the processing of qualitative data were not amenable to the embodiment strategy. In these fields
office machines were applied to support the specialisation of labour in office work. Standardised
human-machine interfaces became a crucial adoption criterion, as they were the basic technical
element around which the activity and the qualification requirements could be shaped. Where this
was not the case, their importance was secondary and hardly if ever any standardisation took place.
This becomes particularly clear for the development of bookkeeping practice. Bookkeeping was
sliced into a sequence of distinct and specialised occupations. A change of methods, organisation
and processes took place gradually. The first step in that direction was to separate data handling
activities from activities of data analysis. The latter were not amenable to standardisation, whilst
the first largely were. Thereby the dichotomy of bookkeeping and accounting emerged.
17
Bookkeeping activities in turn were divided into activities of work preparation and activities of data
manipulation.
Work preparation tasks, such as the sorting of vouchers and receipts and the search of related
ledgers, were executed without mechanical aides, but reached a high degree of specialisation in
manpower. Data manipulation activities in turn entailed the codification, processing and evaluation
of data and were supported by mechanical equipment ( Pirker (1962): p. 81-3). Here adding
machines, calculators, bookkeeping and billing machines or even Hollerith systems were adopted.
The level of rationalisation and standardisation that was reached in each individual firm was
dependent on the type of equipment used, which in turn was determined by the scale at which the
information had to be processed.
All this had to be accompanied also be improvements and changes in bookkeeping practice as well
as changes in commercial law and taxation. Bound ledger books and registers were replaced by a
loose-leaf system of accounts (Wooton and Kemmerer (1996): p.553). Another major improvement
was the single-entry system, by which, through the use of carbon paper, all the necessary entries in
the different registers could be done in one single step (Pirker (1962): p.80). These changes in turn
had to be sanctioned through changes in the legal system that regulated accounting practices.
                                                
16 The citation summarises the headings of the sections in the chapter on office organisation in the reference.
17 Bookkeeping refers to pure record keeping activities while accounting entails analytical activities.12
The evidence presented so far suggests that office machines had to meet three necessary conditions
in order to be adopted: they had to complement a function of the administration of a firm, and they
had to have a cost minimising effect. The third and most important requirement was that they
should allow increasing the independence of operations from scarce clerical labour, i.e. they should
be instrumental in increasing the separability of office activities from the scarce input.
4.2.  The product technology of office work
[Table  1: Early information technology: innovation characteristics of the most important
technologies of the IT Regime, about here]
4.2.1.  Typewriters and typing: technical characteristics, the viability of the technological
choice and new activity profiles
Typewriters were the first technology of the new office work regime. Their domain of application
were all activities involving the multiplication and distribution of information on small scale, i.e. in
practically all functional fields of organisations producing mail, internal memos and
communications, customer-, personnel- and bookkeeping records, contracts, etc. They supported
co-ordination functions within the organisation. The information that was processed with them was
qualitative and changing continuously, which made an embodiment of any type of skill impossible
(Cortada (1993): p.23, Pirker (1962): p.53, Leffingwell and Robinson (1950): p.163).
SEPARABILTIY AND EMBODIMENT
The typewriter as technical artefact was an innovation but strictly speaking it did not represent a
productivity increasing technical advance in itself. The mechanical construction of the typewriter
did not embody any specific clerical knowledge or skills so that its use did not automatically lead to
an increase in productivity. The crucial criterion for adoption of the typewriter became its
(standardised) human-machine interface. The (quite special) interaction of service requirements and
technological characteristics gave birth at first to the QWERTY keyboard, with which its inventors
succeeded by way of a trial and error procedure to order the keys in a way that during high speed
writing the types would not entangle (Adler (1973), David (1985)). The subsequent development of
touch-typing played a crucial role in making the typewriter a viable technology for business
administrations, as it contributed to produce a homogeneous labour supply, and to increase
productivity. The co-existence of different keyboards with different practices would have lead to a
segmentation of the labour market with an inevitably lower elasticity of supply.
18
In the late 1870s Remington, the first mover in the typewriter industry, started setting up its own
typing schools and to furnish trained (female) operators with each machine sold in one package
(see Keep (1997): p.406). In 1882 a first textbook on the touch-typing method appeared (Martin
(1949): p.479) as a result of the marketing efforts undertaken by Remington to boost the sales of its
typewriters.
For adopting firms typewriters represented fixed capital therefore it was an obvious choice to
organise their operation in such a way that their rate of utilisation was maximised. This led to the
set up of centralised services for typing, (see Leffingwell and Robinson (1950): p. 34) and through
that to functional office departments, which pooled standardised activities. The use of one single
method proved to be an efficient monitoring tool, as variance measures could be used in order to
evaluate the output of each single typist (ibid: p. 539).  Typing became a profession and an
administrative process on its own right. Typist had a sharply circumscribed activity profile which
consisted in taking (shorthand-)notes and writing them on paper with the machine using a particular
                                                
18 This argument was put forward by Gardey (1999).13
typing method. Further improvements on the established standards of practice were attained
through standardisations of letter styles and formulations, thereby influencing the way business
correspondence was done (Leffingwell and Robinson (1950): p.143 ff.).
VIABILITY OF THE TECHNOLOGY AND THE DEVELOPMENT TRAJECTORY
After an initial period of fermentation, where different keyboard designs and typing methods
competed for dominance, the QWERTY keyboard imposed itself as the dominant design. The
technological closure took place after Underwood had introduced its Model 5 in 1895 that was the
first to use a front strike design and the QWERTY keyboard with shift keys. It was superior to
competing designs as typing speed could be increased further (see  Knie (1991): p.117). By 1900
most of the technical features of the manual typewriter had been introduced. Further improvements
regarded complementary technologies such as dictating machines and the electrification of the
typewriter.  Martin (1949) remarks, that already in the early 1920s the speed potential of the
typewriter exceeded the capacity of typists by large. While a keyboard design optimised under an
ergonomic perspective could have made typing user-friendlier, less onerous and less error-prone,
the speed of typing could have been increased only marginally. The technological trajectory of the
typewriter underscores the successful configuration of this design. Indeed, by using the touch
typing method a skilled typist was able to type sixty words on average, which was twice as much
as the speed world record for handwriting of thirty words a minute established in 1853 (Yates
(1989): p.37). This was a remarkable increase in productivity. Considering that in 1879 Remington
sold its Model II for 100US$ (157,3US$ in 1929 prices) a piece (Cortada (1993): p.17) and that by
the employment of female typists the salary expenses could be reduced by 400 to 800 US$ a year
per employee as compared to a male clerk, the choice of the typewriter reduced cost and increased
the speed and the scale at which memos, letter and the like could be produced.
4.2.2.  Bookkeeping devices and bookkeeping: technical characteristics, the viability of the
technological choice and new activity profiles
As our discussion in section 3.2.1 shows the rise of large administrative organisations in the US
manufacturing resulted to a large extent from an attempt to gather and evaluate more quantitative
data on the production process with the aim of developing standard cost measures, analyse market
development, derive operating ratios and deliver indicators for the management and investors.
Bookkeeping and accounting became the most important set of organisational processes. It
consisted in activities of gathering, classifying, coding, sorting, calculating, summarising and
reporting of information. Positions as a bookkeeper required individuals to have reading and
mathematical skills. The capability to perform simple mathematical operations was of foremost
importance: rationalisation studies showed that almost 60% of all tasks performed in office work
consisted of calculations that consisted to 80% of counting and adding (Pirker (1962): p.66). For
information to be a valuable source for managerial decision-making the data had to be processed
quickly and without mistakes.  It does not take by surprise that adding and calculating machines
became the second main pillar of the First IT Regime.
19 Most of these devices were innovated in
the late 1880s, but diffused only about ten to fifteen years later on a larger scale.
20
SEPARABILITY AND EMBODIMENT: CALCULATORS AND BOOKKEEPING MACHINES
Adding and calculating machines were general-purpose tools, as typewriters. They were applicable
to a vast range of uses, such as the calculation of daily ledger and cash balances, daily
recapitulation, the checking of invoices, freight bills, disbursements and so forth. The mechanical
                                                
19 Adding machines could only perform additions and in rare cases also subtractions, while calculators could perform all
the basic arithmetic operations and some more elaborate mathematical operations, like calculating directly percentages.
20 An explanation for this slow initial diffusion speed may be seen in the fact that bookkeeping practice and related
legislation had to change as well.14
adding mechanism of these machines embodied the most important skill of a good bookkeeper:
quick and reliable adding.
Bookkeeping machines evolved out of other office appliances and entered the market only in the
1920s. In most cases they were tailored to specific uses and were essentially combinations of an
adding machine with a typewriter or just normal adding machines with mechanisms allowing
special carriage movements. The domain of application was similar to that of adding machines.
On a small scale adding machines and calculators were adopted in order to support accounting
clerks in their work. In this field their use favoured a more rational design of the workplace and a
more rational work preparation. If the volume of data was large computation pools were set up or
alternatively the work was sourced out to specialised firms. The operators of the large accounting
and adding machines used there could be introduced to the work very quickly. Typical candidates
for these jobs were female grammar school graduates, who were able to learn the use of these
machines within a few days ( Pirker (1962), p.82). No profession with a specific skill profile
appeared, as it had been the case for the typewriter. The reliability and the speed of the computing
mechanisms dominated all other considerations, and the human-machine interface played only a
secondary role. Comptometer Co. and Burroughs, the two first-movers in the industry, offered full
keyboard machines with 81 keys. Dalton and Sundstrand, the two most important followers in the
industry used 10-key keyboards. Both designs co-existed up to the 1950s. The two elements
determining the lock-in of skill and keyboard in typing were irrelevant for these devices. The
interface never obtained the same importance, as the locus of the labour saving potential was
embodied. Basic accounting and billing activities became separable from skilled labour inputs.
VIABILITY: CALCULATORS AND BOOKKEEPING MACHINES
The rationalisation effect of calculators and bookkeeping machines consisted in two main features:
first, long rows of numbers could be condensed into one single key figure much faster than before.
Second, some machines incorporated automatic control devices so that wrong entries were almost
impossible. By that the accuracy of these sensible operations improved substantially.
Some optimistic and perhaps overly simplistic studies cited in Pirker (1962), p. 67, found that a
well-trained machine operator was able to do the work of three clerks, resulting in savings of in
total salary costs of up to 70%. In 1885, in the year of its market introduction, Burroughs offered its
machines for 790US$ (1929 prices; Cortada (1993): p.32), the adoption of calculators was a cost
saving strategy for large and medium-sized firms
Only for larger firms accounting machines were viable choices.  The rental rate ranged from 150 to
500 US$ a month (165-520US$ 1929 prices; Cortada (1993): p.125), summing up to an annual
expenditure of 1800 to 6000 US$ a year which amounted to the annual salary of one to three clerks.
Taking into account the productivity factors that could be achieved by the application of such
machines shown in  Table 2 savings were considerable: current account transactions could be
carried out ten to twenty times faster as a single clerk could do in purely manual execution.
[Table 2: Data processing capabilities of early accounting machines round 1926, about here]
SEPARABILITY AND EMBODIMENT: HOLLERITH MACHINES
Hollerith and Powers machines were very different from the previously listed technologies. They
represented a system of electromechanical devices conceived in order to codify and operate on
quantitative data on a large scale. They were first developed for public institutions with the purpose
to speed up counting and sorting processes, which were prone to mistakes and very laborious.
Large business firms discovered the value of these machines soon, as these machines could be used
to tabulate sales statistics, sort consumer trend analyses, for payroll and inventory management,
etc.
21 A tabulating system consisted of punched cards which were the media on which operating
                                                
21 The first business user was the New York Central Railroad in 1896 using Hollerith gears to process up to four million
freight bills a year in order to produce summary reports more frequently. After 1900 large firms in other sectors than15
instructions and information were stored, card punch machines, used to transfer the information on
the cards, sorting machines and a tabulator used to count the sorted cards. The sorters could be
programmed with other punched cards on which a sorting routine was codified. This allowed these
machines to be re-programmed and made them very flexible.
This technology was used to process company wide data on a large (industrial) scale. Unlike
adding machines, they were not just mechanical supports for a given problem, but were an integral
part of a larger information system. This becomes clear if we consider that to sell such devices “a
salesmen had not to sell the machine but the organisation” (Pirker (1962): p.79). Salesmen acted as
technical advisors as well as organisation designer. Organisational concepts developed for
businesses in one particular sector were then used as a blueprint (and sale argument) for other firms
in that sector (McPherson (1992)).
The operation of these machines was split into three distinct activities: (i) the codification of sorting
and tabulating routines, (ii) the codification of the information to be evaluated and (iii) the
evaluation itself, i.e. the actual sorting and tabulating of information. Accounting and organisation
specialists carried out the codification of routines. Specific sorting and tabulating processes were
stored on punched cards and used when necessary. The programming of routines and routine
sequences was an activity that happened only sporadically at the set up of the machine and
subsequent organisational changes. The codification and evaluation of information were instead
recurrent tasks.
Through their codified programs these machines embodied procedural knowledge on clerical
operations on a hitherto unknown extent and almost completely isolated productivity increases in
data processing from the skills of the operators of these machines.
22 With the appearance of
tabulating machine rooms “for the first time something appears in the office, that can be compared
to the working practice on the shop floor” ( Pirker (1962): p.95 own translation). The high
specialisation and division of labour typical for the shop-floor in the American System found its
correspondence in a number of new occupations, that differed mainly in their skill profile: key-
punch operators codified and controlled the information; sorters were responsible for the
supervision of sorting and tabulating processes; lead-machine operators (also called tabulators)
were responsible for the wiring of the control panels and the verification of the machines and
programmers finally were responsible for the cybernetic part of the job: programming and
designing process flows. The skill requirements increased in ascending order: the skill requirements
for key-punch operators and sorters were primary school degrees, tabulators needed to have
specific technical skills and held therefore mostly secondary school. The few needed programmers
were university graduates in mathematics or engineering and were seen as professional organisers
and operated in a middle management environment (see table 1 for a overwiew on skill profiles and
training periods).
VIABILITY AND TRAJECTORY: HOLLERITH MACHINES
As Table 2 shows, the volume and the speed of information processed shifted upwards by two to
three orders of magnitude. The bottleneck remained the codification of the data. Yet this operation
was carried out faster on punch card machines than on any other data-processing machines. In 1896
Hollerith offered his machine for a yearly rental rate of 1000US$ (approx. 1950US$ 1929 prices)
and sold a package of hundred cards for one dollar (2 dollars in 1929 prices). A large firm used
                                                                                                                                                   
railroads started using these equipment as well. The first business users were insurance companies, which used the
machine for evaluating mortality statistics. Among other large firms were Marshal Field, Eastman Kodak, Scoville Co.,
National Tube, Pennsylvania Steel, Western Electric (see Cortada (1993): pp. 50 and 54 and Yates (1993)).
22 Exceptions were keypunches. Their efficient operation relied on the speed with which the codification could take place.
In first place this led either to the adoption of the typewriter keyboard (for alphanumerical insertions) or a 10-key
keyboard (for purely numerical insertions) with the keys ordered in four rows. Both allowed using touch-typing methods.
As the codification of data continued to be the bottleneck in this technology, the use of standardised interfaces was
important.16
several millions of these cards each year. In the 1930s the rental rate ranged from 3000 to 6000
US$ a year (Cortada (1993): pp.49-50). The enormous productivity possibilities made tabulating
gears viable for large firms.
The degree of skill embodiment of most of the technologies finds its reflection also in their
technological trajectories. The last column of  Table  1 shows that the improvements regarded
mostly the data throughput, processing speed, the simultaneous data processing capability and
widening of the scope of application of the devices.
4.3. The technological bias and the economic implications of the adoption of the First
IT Regime in US manufacturing, 1889-1937
The historical record presented so far suggests that there was a capital deepening bias in the
development of the First IT Regime. We put forward the hypothesis, that given the peculiar
characteristics of the American technological style, the capital intensity of office work should have
been increasing. In support for this conjecture we find, that the per-capita value of capital used for
administrative purposes in relation to administrative personnel (Coffice/LA) in US manufacturing
increased over the years between 1889 and 1937 (table 3). However, this ratio does not tell whether
these changes were due to a general tendency in manufacturing to increase the capital stock at any
level of employment or whether the ratio increased even though the number of clerks increased.
Indeed the capital-labour ratio for manufacturing as a whole (Ctot/Ltot) and the capital-labour ratio
for office work (Coffice/LA) do correlate over the whole period (table 4, first row) in a statistically
significant way. The degree of mechanisation (Coffice/LA) and the degree of "bureaucratisation",
(A/P) given by the ratio of clerical to production workers are positively correlated (table 4, third
row), supporting the hypothesis that the capital intensity in office work increased in a period of
expanding business administrations. But this does not take in account cost related substitution
effects, which are at the core of our hypothesis.
23
[Table 3: Capital-labour relationships in US manufacturing and the First IT Regime and its bias in
technical change, 1889-1937, about here]
The changing relationship between capital stock and labour is measured best by the ratio of the
value of capital stock per man-hour to wages or salaries per man-hour (CMHtotal/WMH total,
CMHoffice/WMHoffice,). Now the picture turns ambiguous.
24 The data in table 3, row 3 shows that
production in overall manufacturing was capital intense, but the ratio declined after 1899 and
started levelling out only in the late 1920s. Office work remained labour intense over almost the
whole period (table 3, row 4). The value of capital as well as the wage costs fell over the period
between 1899 and 1919 corresponding to a general slowdown in total factor productivity, reaching
their lower peak between 1909 and 1919. Taken over the whole period the value of office capital
employed per man-hour increased steadily. Nevertheless, in the decade between 1919 and 1929 the
unit-salaries almost doubled and reached a level that remained constant for the three decades that
followed. While all the other factors grew in close relationship to total factor productivity, unit-
salaries grew over-proportionately and the increase of the unit value of office capital slowed down.
This suggests that the capital intensity in the office increased up to 1929, when the large office
machine pools were set up. Up to the late 1920s the degree of mechanisation of office work
followed the grand pattern of the American System and changed thereafter. By that time most of
the office machine pools had been set up. Nevertheless, office work remained a labour intense
because of the remaining knowledge intensity of many clerical and managerial activities, so that the
                                                
23 We cannot account for changes in productivity of the single factors as for office work as there is no adequate output
measure, nevertheless, the single factors of the coefficients strongly correlate with TFP in manufacturing ( Kendrick,
1961: table D-I) over the period 1889 to 1937: CMHoff r= 0,65, CMHtot r=0,91, WMHoff r= 0,93, WMHtot r=0,97.
24 For the sake of shortness we will call the capital stock per man-hour unit-capital stock and the wage/salary per man-
hour the unit wage/salary.17
same degree of mechanisation as on the shop floor could not be reached in office work. The
diverging growth pattern between wages and salaries which increased the wage premium on
clerical work, suggests that the productivity of clerical work had sharply increased between 1919
and 1929.
25
In the period between 1889 and 1937 the development of capital intensity in the manufacturing
sector as a whole started diverging from that in its administrative units: the unit value of capital in
relation to the unit wage declined. This development stands in contrast to the logic of the American
System of Manufactures where capital replaces labour. The degree of electrification negatively
correlates at high significance levels with the unit capital-labour rate (table 3, row 6). After 1899 a
paradigm shift of production had taken place when electric power replaced steam as primary source
of energy. The use of electric power drives in industry saved fixed capital (David, 1991: p.334),
therefore the real rate of accumulation declined. Capital costs could be lowered through
decentralised power units and the possibility to transport energy over long distances brought energy
even to the remotest places. Energy intense production methods no longer depended on the
presence of a factory owned power generation unit. This shows that even though electrification and
bureaucratisation overlapped, the scope of these technology adoptions differed, as electrification
was a capital saving technical progress.
[Table 4: Economic effects of the First IT Regime in US manufacturing: correlations., about here]
The question remains, whether the adoption of the First IT Regime indeed helped to lower
production costs and to achieve "economies of speed". Table 2 shows that office machines
increased the speed of clerical operations. Melman (1951) found that in the period between 1899
and 1947 large firms were able to keep their administrative expenditures per dollar of production
expense lower than small businesses despite the rise in the administrative overhead. This seems to
have raised also the profitability of production through better co-ordination and organisation of the
shop floor. Larger firms benefited more from their use than smaller ones, indicating that scale
economies played an important role in the adoption decision of single firms. The correlation
analysis in table 4 shows that value added (VA) correlates with the share of clerks in total staff
(A/P) and with the share of office machinery and furniture in total capital (Coffice/Ctotal). These
relationships are particularly strong for the sub-period between 1899 and 1919. In that period the
changes of these shares (DA/P and D C office/Ctotal) and the changes in value added (DVA) are also
correlated, but the effects are ambiguous after 1919. The correlation between the rates of change
over the whole period is weakly negative and statistically insignificant different from zero.
5.  Summary and conclusion
In this paper we discussed the adoption of early information technologies in US manufacturing
between 1870 and 1930. A new technological regime developed, which was part of a larger
reconfiguration of the technology system, taking place with the rise of managerial capitalism. It led
to the constitution of a new industry and it diffused into almost all sectors of the economy. It
shaped the working profile of the emerging white-collar working class and supported the
establishment of new professions.
Our study shows that firms started their search for new administrative techniques, the moment a
given set of productive activities became inconsistent with the scale of production required. This
problem resulted out of previous changes in the production system. The inconsistency of the
                                                
25 Other reasons for this fact could have been either the relative shortage of clerical workers or a higher wage negotiation
power. These alternatives do not find historical support. While the first point is not relevant, as the sources indicate that
by that time the problem of clerical labour shortage had largely been overcome, the second is of lesser importance, as
clerical workers were not unionised (Douglas, 1927: p.573ff).18
established office work regime resulted from its incapacity to cope with the flow of information
that had to be processed. Firms reacted by trying to identify and isolate the bottlenecks through an
increase in the division of labour. Typical bottlenecks were high information throughput activities
and the factor increasing the overhead over proportion was scarce clerical labour. The response to
the identification of this problem reflects the factor price history and engineering experience in the
US: through the application of the heuristic underlying the American System of Manufactures
organisational designers tried to overcome the problem by a full-embodiment strategy which
allowed to isolate the critical factor, clerical skills, and by that to make clerks themselves
exchangeable parts of the system of information production. The extent to which this separation
was possible finds its reflection in the subsequent innovations, technological trajectories and
emerging path dependencies of the new regime. Finally, we showed that although electrification
and the rise of administration overlapped they followed a different logic of technology adoption.
The observed patterns of technological development coincided with our theoretical conjectures.
The search capitalist entrepreneurs undertook in the technology space was determined by the
constraining factors and a response to the structure of economic incentives. This was not a search in
the neighbourhood of the established technique, but one in which the logic of a different
technological subsystem was projected into the domain of office work.
In this process indivisibilities played an important role in shaping the actual pattern of technical
change. The influence of input prices on unit cost can be best controlled if they can be easily
substituted for each other, something that in general is assumed to hold true a priori in neo-
classical models. But this is never the case. If skilled labour constrains production, then capitalists
have a strong incentive to separate their activities from this input through codification and
embodiment. But the extent to which this is possible depends much on the complexity of the
involved knowledge and hence the costs of codification. We have studied here three cases in which
this became apparent: typewriters did not embody any type of skills, as the character of information
they were used to process was not standardisable. With adding and accounting machines a high
degree of embodiment was reached, but many changes in the field of bookkeeping took the form of
disembodied technological advances. Finally, Hollerith machines represented a technological
improvement that was almost completely embodied.
The adoption of any of these technologies eventually led to an increase of the elasticity of labour
supply for clerical jobs, as workers with a lower skill profile as clerks had before could be
employed. Accordingly the skill requirements for office work were to a large extent inversely
related to the degree of embodiment.
Our study shows that disembodied advances were a precondition for embodied technical change. It
was during the phases of disembodied technical change, that codification of skills and knowledge
took place. Once this had been attained the incentive structure was such that firms proceeded to the
adoption of skill embodying capital almost surely. What appears to be of interest as well is that the
technical advance here studied did not generate a reserve army, but the "creative response" of
capitalist firms was such as to generate activities where less skilled workers out of the total
potential workforce could be recruited. This suggests that the concept of Marx bias needs some
reconsideration, as it starts from the idea that the Babbage principle is applied to given activities in
order to keep a reserve army of workers and by that wages at the subsistence level. What is
nevertheless observed here – in a situation where the laws of techno-economic evolution changed -
is an inter-temporal substitution of capital for labour resulting from the attempt to relax constraints
on the production process. In the cases studied here the absence of a reserve army for a new set of
activities was pushing innovative efforts. The skill requirements of these activities were defined
only gradually, as the technology co-evolved with the economic environment.19
Table 1: Early information technology: innovation characteristics of the most important technologies of the IT Regime
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Touch-typing (round 60 words a minute),
shorthand writing at least 60-75 words a
minute  (partly replaced by Dictaphones),
good language and grammar skills, letter
writing ability. High school degree preferred.
Training period: approx.250-400 hours
Dominant design: front stroke types,
QWERTY keyboard, shift key.
Reduction of typing effort and
increase of possible typing speed
(electrical typewriters), noise
(noiseless typewriters) and size





















also on sporadic base.
Establishment of
computation pools.
Machine use. Touch-typing. Training period:
few days. Girls round 17 years of age with two
years in secondary school.
Large number of application domains – no
clear dominant design. Two main principles:
adding machines based only on the operation
of addition. Calculators that could perform
four basic operations. Full keyboards and ten
key keyboards.
Size, user interface (ease of touch),
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also the form of
bookkeeping pools.
Machine use. Training period: accounting
clerks with double-entry skills two weeks.
Several niche application domains for large
scale and back office processing; no clear
dominant design. Interface depending on the
base machine, i.e. typewriter, calculator or
cash register.
Corresponding widely to
























Puncher: in some cases typing skills mostly
not; primary school degree. No further skills
needed. Training period: 1-4 month
Sorter: No special skills, but strong physical
constitution required; primary school degree.
Training period: round 6 month.
Tabulator: secondary school degree and
technical skills. Training period: 1,5 to 2
years.
Programmer: organisational skills, business
skills; preferably university degree in
mathematics or a technical discipline. Training
period: 4 years.
Dominant design: punched cards as data and
as program memory, punch, sort and tabulate
process, electric contact principle; interfaces
are typewriter – like or typewriter keyboards,
10-key keyboards.
Speed of all parts of the system (e.g.
tabulator speed 1900: 415 cards an
hour; 1926: up to 4500 cards an hour),
size and information content of cards
(12 rows 24 columns in 1890, 10 rows
37 columns in 1906, 80 rows 10
columns 1928, 90 column format by
Remington Rand in 1930) and related
processing capacity (e.g. multiplying
punch 1931), improvements of punch
process, and further mechanisation of
processes (e.g. collator device).
                                                
26 Compiled using information contained in Brauner and Vogt (1921), Meuthen (1926), Leffingwell and Robinson (1950), Pirker (1962), Cortada (1993), Martin (1949).20
Table 2: Data processing capabilities of early accounting machines round 1926








Clerk, manual execution 270 (0,03 kbytes) 6 1
Burroughs Adding machine 5400  (0,675 kbytes) 120 20
National Cash register 6300 (0,78 kbytes) 140 23,3
Smith Premier (typewriter
combined with a calculator)
2475 (0,31 kbytes) 55 9,166
Elliot Fisher (typewriter
combined with a calculator)
2475 (0,31 kbytes) 55 9,166
Ellis (typewriter combined with a
calculator)
5400  (0,675 kbytes) 120 20
Underwood accounting machine 2925 (0,37 kbytes) 65 10,83
Hollerith or Powers card punch
machine
6750-11250 (0, 84 – 1,4 kbytes) 150-250 25 – 41,6
Hollerith or Powers sorting
machine
675000-810000 (84,375 – 101, 250
kbytes)
15000-18000 2500 - 3000
Hollerith or Powers tabulating
machine
162000-202500 (20,25 – 25,31 kbytes) 3600-4500 600 – 750
                                                
27 For the calculations we have used information contained in Meuthen (1926). We used the figure of a punched card for a current account transaction (p.43) and the table of single cases that could be
performed by the single machines (p.48). On the displayed punched card for such a transaction on 45 columns of 10 digits each the following information was stored: date of the transaction (6 columns),
the number and page of the main register (3+3 columns), the type of the transaction (2 columns), the department (2 columns), the main and secondary number of the current account (5+2 columns), debit
and credit (8+8 columns) and finally the day and month of the booking (2+2 columns).  The information in each of the 45 columns represents 1 bit (on of the ten rows is punched or not punched). It
should be noted, that this is only the information content of the card due to the punches and not the information content if the data would be codified by binary numbers, which is likely to be much
higher.  We calculated hence the implicit information processing capacity and not the effective one. Furthermore we compare the transactions on the basis of how the most advanced technology
(Hollerith: punched cards) of the time codified information. This entails that with the purely manual system information was not just written on one single card, but that entailed to fill in fields in several
different registers manually, for which a clerk on average needed 10 minutes for one single current account booking operation, Meuthen (1926): 47. Strictly speaking we compare different production
functions with the same output.21
Table 3: Capital-labour relationships in US manufacturing and the First IT Regime and its bias in technical
change, 1889-1937
Year 1899 1889 1904 1909 1914 1919 1929 1937
Ctotal/Ltotal
(1929 US$)
3260,98 2171,17 3259,57 3375,85 3871,34 2816,42 6115,11 5586,13
Coffice/LA
 (1929 US$)
17,31 13,04 17,72 20,49 23,68 20,02 49,90 30,60
CMHtotal/WMHtotal
(1929 US$)
3,34 2,58 n.a. 3,20 n.a. 2,77 2,04 1,96
CMHoffice/WMHA
 (1929 US$)
0,60 0,47 n.a 0,52 n.a 1,14 0,70 0,53
Datasources and definitions see text and data appendix.
Table 4: Economic effects of the First IT Regime in US manufacturing: correlations.
Total period: 1889-1937 Subperiod
Ctotal/Ltotal  with Coffice/LA 0.921
*** 0.852
**    (1889-1919)
CMHtotal/WMHtotal with
CMHoffice/WMHA
0.034 -0.220     (1889-1919)
Coffice/LA with A/P 0.581 0.521
        (1889-1919)
CMHoffice/WMHA with A/P 0.339 0.743
        (1889-1919)





VA to A/P 0.685
** 0.975
*** (1899-1919)
VA to Coffice/Ctotal 0.762
** 0.858
*    (1899-1919)
DVA to DA/P -0.143     (1904-1937) 0.857
*    (1904-1921)
DVA to DCoffice
/Ctotal -0.204       (1904-1937) 0.883
      (1904-1919)
 *** statistically  significant at the 1% level
 ** statistically significant at the 5%  level
 * statistically significant at the 10% level
Datasources and definitions see text and  appendix.22
Data Appendix:
Variable  Meaning  Source
Coffice office machinery and furniture in the manufacturing sector own calculations (see below)
Ctotal  total capital in the manufacturing sector Census (1976), P123-176, E42
LA,  non-production workers, classified as clerical workers in the Census (1976), P1-12
manufacturing sector
Ltota:  all employed persons in the manufacturing sector Census (1976), P1-12
A/P  ratio of non-production to production workers Census (1976), D233- 681,  Kendrick (1961)
table A-XI, p.314
WMHA  salaray per man hour (only clerical personnel) Census (1976), P1-12, E42,  Kendrick (1961)
table A-XI, p.314
WMHtotal  total wage and salary bill per man hour Census (1976), P1-12, E42,  Kendrick (1961)
table A-XI, p.314
CMHA  value of office machinery and furniture per man hour Census (1976), P1-12, P357-58, E42, Kendrick
(1961) table A-XI, p.314
CMHtotal   total capital per man hour Census (1976), P123-176, E42,  Kendrick
(1961) table A-XI, p.314
VA value added in the manufacturing sector Census (1976), P1-12, E42
Degree of  degree of electrification in US manufacturing   David (1991), p.327, table 3 column 1.
Electrification
Computation of Coffice:
Series P357, P358 from  Census (1976), giving the yearly output of office machinery and furniture were deflated by the
wholesalesprice index, E42, to prices of 1929. For each year an export share of 20% for office machinery and 10% for office
furniture was assumed following indications in Engler (1970): p.100ff., and Unger (1940): p.57. Due to the specific US tarif history
(see Engler (1970)), imports were deliberately set to zero. These data were cumulated assuming a simultaneous exit after ten years. A
comparative analysis with linear scraping or progressive scraping methods have shown, that this method tends to overestimate the
absolute stock of capital. The growth trends are nevertheless identical. The imputation of the so calculated US capital stock of office
furniture and machinery to manufacturing was done by calculating the share of manufacturing in total worked man hours in the
national economy given by Kendrick (1961), Table A-XI, p. 314. This coefficient was then multiplied with the share of non-
production workers to production workers calculated from series P1-12 in US manufacturing. The resulting coefficient of clerical
labour intensity in manufacturing was multiplied with the calculated total capital stock value, thus assuming a fixed coefficient
production function for clerical activities. It has to be remarked that regardless of the previous explanations the C office coefficient
heavily underestimates the real capital stock used for administrative purposes, as we do not take into account buildings dedicated to
these activities, which was rapidly increasing in that period (building of skyscrapers).23
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